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COMMENTARY ON WEST & GARVEY
GERARD

V.

BRADLEY*

This exchange was not vouchsafed auspicious timing. Just
two days before Professors West and Garvey delivered these
good and courageous papers, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in the case of Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment
Security.' Professing a stripped-down Bible Christianity, an outof-work William Frazee refused otherwise suitable Sunday work
because it sullied the Lord's day. For that he was administratively denied unemployment benefits, and he sought a free
exercise judicial reversal of the decision. But unlike similarly
situated claimants in Sherbert,' Thomas' and Hobbie,4 Frazee
belonged to neither sect nor church, and did not claim participation in any established religious doctrines. The Illinois
courts rejected his free exercise claim. The Illinois appellate
court said, "[t]he injunction against Sunday labor must be
found in a tenet ...of an established religious sect" in order to
qualify for Free Exercise protection.5 To the surprise of no
one who follows its church-state jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court reversed. The Sherbert "conduct exemption" attached to
individual, sincerely-held religious belief, the Court said.
Requiring affiliation with sect or dogma was "clearly erroneous. "6 The solitary conscience was the touchstone of religious
freedom.
Frazee dealt major-though different-blows to West and
Garvey. The Court reaffirmed precisely that interpretation of
free exercise which it is the burden of West's paper to bury.
West treats "church autonomy" as an effect of the Sherbert conduct exemption, and in his view the whole enterprise should be
scuttled. Garvey gains access to "church autonomy" through
the Watson 7 property dispute precedents, and he wants to suffuse free exercise analysis with a premium on religious groups
*
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and corporate belief. But Frazee championed the summum bonum
of all church state jurisprudence: individual "autonomy" to
"choose" religious beliefs in a completely "neutral" environment. Unfortunately, both blows caught me on the chin. I
heartily agree with Garvey that real spiritual freedom requires
more solicitude for group integrity than our constitutional law
has provided; indeed, individual autonomy (as that term is now
generally understood) has rather little, in my opinion, to do
with religious liberty. I also agree with West: the conduct
exemption is ill-founded and ought to be abandoned.
I.

WEST'S VIEW OF CHURCH AUTONOMY

West puts the question squarely: Do churches, like individuals, sometimes have a right to be excused from laws that
burden the exercise of their religion? West concludes: to
some extent they do, but not as much as most commentators
think and wish they do, and much more than Ellis West thinks
they should. West is mainly interested in refuting the middle
conclusion, the common view that "church autonomy" exemptions stem from the same understanding of free exercise that
yielded individual exemptions for Sherbert and its progeny.
Effectively gainsaying Garvey's organizing ideas, he regards
"churches" the same as he does believing individuals. Neither
is entitled to conduct exemptions.
His argument has two main parts. The first is a set of six
arguments against religious exemptions as a constitutional
right. The most cogent is his fifth, which subverts the conduct
exemptions by killing its "gatekeeper." How? By precluding
courts from examining the religious character of the activity for
which protection is sought. 8 In other words, the regime's profession of doctrinal nonentanglements prevents this "religious" exemption from getting off the ground by making
"religion" undefinable. Actually, the opposite has occurred.
For better or for worse (and West thinks it for worse), courts
have managed to get by without resolving doctrinal issues. In
virtually all such cases the state has conceded a sincere religious belief, as it has in most church autonomy cases. In any
event, where religion is defined, it 9 is defined functionally, not
doctrinally, as "ultimate concern."
In pressing this fifth criticism West comes very close to
arguing against any law of "church and state." He seems to
8. West, The Case Against A Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 591, 609-11 (1990).

9.
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hanker for a regime in which religion is juridically invisible,
assimilated incognito into the legal corpus by private law, like
that of contracts. At least this seems the cardinal virtue of his
preferred regime, one bereft of special treatment for religion.
In conclusion West says he does not argue for such a "strict
neutrality," but admits immediately that even he is puzzled by
this limp concession.' Also, elsewhere in the paper he concedes that the religion clauses say something about a distinct
phenomenon called "religion," and that that something has to
do with protecting "religion" (including churches) against hostile legislation. For example, West agrees that legislation
which intentionally harms religion violates the Constitution.
How would he recognize such an occasion without somehow
deciding what "religion" is? Do laws against polygamy, for
example, violate this constitutional prohibition? I suspect West
would say no. But in arriving at that conclusion he must have
implicitly performed a theologically-guided investigation of the
law and legislative intent against some fleshy account of "religion." On top of all this, while West is demonstrably eager to
challenge prevailing assumptions both in the corpus and in the
commentary, he uncritically accepts the Everson " "no aid or
encouragement" rendition of nonestablishment. With several
scholarly refutations of that rendition now afoot, all employing
West's preferred historical hermeneutic, 1 2 his failure to notice
them is a major oversight.
To comment briefly on West's other arguments against
religious exemptions: His first argument,'" from neutrality,
really cuts both ways. The purpose of conferring religious
exemptions is generally to restore defacto government neutrality.
In Frazee, for example, an otherwise neutral, valid law has
worked a de facto disadvantage upon certain persons. Unlike
religiously affiliated sabbatarians, Mr. Frazee cannot have his
cake and eat it too, his religion and his benefits. West's "neutrality" is, therefore, strictly dejure. His sixth argument," 4 that
the conduct exemption tends to produce arbitrary and incoherent law, is clearly right. His second argument' 5 -the risk of
10.
11.
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social divisiveness-is, for reasons I have elsewhere developed,' 6 desperately in need of proper interment. His third reason 7the potential for fraudulent claims-is far too strong; it
cuts against all entitlement programs, indeed all law, that generally creates incentives for people to make their conduct
appear different from what it actually is. The fourth argument 18 correctly notes the anarchic potential of the conduct
exemption rationale.
Now, the main play. West correctly says that most arguments for the conduct exemption are uncritically rooted in the
free exercise text. He then critically seeks that clause's "correct" meaning, and looks for it in the plain meaning of the
clause as understood by its makers. Unlike most contemporary
judges and commentators, I do not quibble with West's methodology, but I would stress that "makers" means ratifiers. His
sources are, however, a problem. He mentions works by Malbin 9 (a good but cursory treatment), Levy2 ° (a long, bad
book), and Miller 2 ' (a good book). But he relies mostly on
Thomas Curry,2 2 especially Curry's last chapter. That is problematic because that chapter is incoherent. It is internally
inconsistent and inconsistent with the rest of the book, which
is, by the way, excellent. West also makes the common but pernicious mistake of seeking the meaning of a familiar legal and
constitutional phrase (and "free exercise" was a mainstay of the
state constitutions) in the speculations of selected notables, not
in the state regimes which created and maintained free exercise
rights. In short, he gives us more intellectual history than
"exegesis", in his sense of what the words meant in their original context.
Despite all that I have just said in criticism of West's modus
operandi, I agree with West that the free exercise clause does not
require the exemption, as of right, of individuals and churches
from otherwise "neutral" laws. What did the free exercise
clause originally mean? West seems to settle upon some form
16. See Bradley, Dogmatomachy--A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion
Clause Cases, 30 ST. Louis L.J. 275, 301-09 (1986).
17. West, supra note 8, at 603-04.
18. Id. at 604-08.
19.
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20.
L.W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST

AMENDMENT (1986).

21.

W.M.

MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN

REPUBLIC (1986).

22.

TJ.

CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA

TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).

COMMENTARY ON WEST & CARVEY

1990]

of no direct or intentional harm to religion. Whatever that
might mean, I suggest the following "plain meaning, historically recovered": no conduct otherwise permitted could be
proscribed because it occurred in the context of worship. Put
differently, free exercise guaranteed freedom of worship in the
specific sense of protecting worship from hostile legal treatment. To take a modern example, only if snake handling or
peyote use are generally proscribed may they validly be denied
to worshippers. You might say, that's not much. Maybe so, but
it was an advance for the founding generation and, well, maybe
the first amendment is not such a big deal after all. This plain
meaning, historically recovered, still speaks profoundly to present constitutional problems, for it shears free exercise of its
present individualistic gloss. Worship is a collective activity,
and it is the subject of free exercise; the solitary conscience is
not.
II.

GARVEY'S GROUPS

The reading of the free exercise clause that I just proposed
may itself provide enough fuel to put John Garvey's central
claim aloft. That claim is as follows: group freedom should
prevail over individual freedom in cases where the two conflict.2" Garvey has the Watson property dispute scenario in
mind, and treats those cases almost exclusively, despite their
origin in a sort of federal common law. Garvey does not pro-.
duce the kind of close exegesis West does, and it is unclear how
he comes out on West's textual verdict against exemptions.
That is, Garvey does not examine church exemption from
otherwise neutral laws, as presented
in cases like Dayton Chris25
tian Schools 2 and Bob Jones.
How then does Garvey justify this priority for groups, a
priority which flies in the face of the contemporary regime's
commitment to individual autonomy? He offers four reasons.
One is what I call the missing Federalist paper argument. If
republican institutions presuppose a virtuous citizenry, as Publius maintained, how shall the citizens be kept virtuous? 26 Publius did not say, but the founders definitely considered religion
the bulwark of virtue. Garvey makes this point and a second,
23.

Garvey, Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4
567 (1990).
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24. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S.
619 (1986).
25. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
26. Garvey, supra note 23, at 587-88.
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related one: religious commitments, especially when institu27
tionalized, limit the totalist tendencies of the modern state.
This I call the missing Constitution argument, meaning that it
serves to limit government in the way a written Constitution is
supposed to. While I think that both points are essentially
accurate, I doubt they are Garvey's strongest arguments. To
the latter his critics will point to an independent judiciary
enforcing the Bill of Rights. To the former they will cite the
potential threat to republican stability posed by religious belief.
There is no doubting the present hegemony of the opinion that
religion taken seriously threatens democracy. Third, Garvey
argues that, paradoxically, autonomy is served by the preference for group freedom over individual freedom in cases of
conflict.2 8 Individuals want the best interests, so to speak, of
the group to prevail. Garvey means that this commitment is
actualized even as the group prevails over the (now aggrieved)
individual. This argument is probably too strained. Disputants
often share a commitment to the best interests of the group;
they happen to have different conceptions of what those interests are. To take a recent example, Fr. Curran no doubt sees
his account of church authority, one which permits a range of
dissent, as best for the Roman Catholic Church, notwithstanding Cardinal Ratzinger's contrary views on the subject.2 9
Garvey's last reason-the one he most stresses and develops-is that for many believers, faith has a necessary ecclesial
dimension.30 As Garvey would say, individual autonomy is not
the objective or the stuff of belief. With this I could hardly
agree more. Unlike Garvey's missing Federalist and Constitution arguments, it is non-instrumental. Moreover, it accords
with what I previously suggested is the "group" thrust of the
first amendment. Finally, it accords with the basic differentiation of orders which we label "church and state."'" Those virtues warrant accepting Garvey's preference for group freedom.
Garvey now proposes to implement this preference by preferring the legal rule of "deference" over "neutral principles." 3 2 A rehearsal of some fundamentals may clarify this
move. Watson stated a general requirement of religious free27.
28.
29.
CURRAN,
30.

Id.
Id. at 587.
See Letter from Ratzinger to Curran (Apr. 13, 1984), reprinted in C.
FAITHFUL DISSENT 227 (1986).
Garvey, supra note 23, at 588.

31. See Bradley, Church Autonomy in the constitutional Orders: The End of
Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057 (1989).
32. Garvey, supra note 23, at 585.
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dom: "The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect." 3 3 This
regulative aspiration produced a rule of "deference":
"[W]henever questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest ...
church judicator[y] to which the matter has been carried, the
[civil] legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as
binding on them, in their application to the case before
them." 4 The second, much more recent, strategy for implementing Watson's religious freedom requirement is the "neutral
principles" approach found in Jones v. Wolf.35 That approach
serves the Watson objective not by deference to ecclesiastical
authority but by resolving the case entirely on "neutral" principles, where "neutral" denotes applicable civil principles. Even
though it, like Watson's "deference" rule, grew out of and was
intended to settle church property disputes, the "neutral principles" approach is not so analytically confined. And, while
Garvey limits his discussion to the property dispute contexts,
the Jones court expressly contemplated its application to other
church practices, including employment decisions like the Curran case. Its virtue is "the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general-flexibility in ordering private rights and
obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties."3 6 Watson's
"neutrality" and "nonentanglement" in doctrinal controversies
are "preserved" by overlaying a regime of voluntarism or
"autonomy." Jones holds that where there is implementation of
agreement, there is "neutrality."
In Jones the Supreme Court effectively invited lower courts
to choose between "deference" and "neutral principles," supposing them each consistent with Watson. But one may allow
that each approach is consistent with Watson without allowing
that they are equally so. Even in church property disputes,
"church autonomy" (here defined as "doctrinal" "neutrality")
is better insured by deference on the ownership question. In
other words, courts should enforce the decision of church
authorities whenever those authorities have taken a discernible
position on that issue. Second, the Supreme Court in Jones too
easily presumed the availability of suitably "neutral" principles.
Rules of ecclesiastical governance simply may not translate into
civil law terms. Suppose, Garvey suggests, that a church consti33.
34.
35.
36.

Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
Id. at 727.
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
Id. at 603.
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tution directs its governing body to order "whatever pertains
to the spiritual welfare" of those under its care. Is property
management an aspect of "spiritual welfare?" Is that not itself
a theological concept? How would "neutral principles" resolve
that question?3 7
It cannot. "Neutral principles" is therefore (at most) an
incomplete approach in need of a complement, probably from
"deference." The Curran opinion qualified its "neutral principles" with "due regard for the right of the Church... to decide
for itself matters of church polity and doctrine." 3 And Judge
Weisberg narrowly escaped importing enormous amounts of
deference only by Fr. Curran's concession that the withdrawal
of his canonical mission was both "substantively and procedurally correct."'39 What if Fr. Curran had contested either, or
both? Then the Court would have faced something like this
question: who is more "Catholic," Cardinal Ratzinger or Fr.
Curran? "Neutral principles" of civil law cannot resolve that
question.
The important point is that the "neutral principles"
approach taken by itself is neither "neutral" nor wholly efficacious. The tensions are deepest between the "private order" of
a hierarchically-organized church and the "neutral principles"
of civil law. This tension may best be illustrated by the role
assigned to "agreement" now, to govern situations arising later,
which is the earmark and purpose of contract law. As Garvey
makes clear, contract principles simply do not explain the unity
of many churches.
The divide here is perhaps more thoroughgoing and decisive than even Garvey contends. The Jones court aspired to a
regime of complete judicial abstention, consummated by perfect planning now for future disputes. But is the analytical infrastructure of "neutral principles" truly "neutral" when it comes
to the central dogma of modernity: individual autonomy, usually connoting a subjectivist or "emotivist" moral theory
against religious, moral and to a lesser extent political authority? I submit that it is not. Even casual re-examination ofJones'
commitment to "private ordering" reveals its source in the animating impulse of contemporary American legal reflection on
religious freedom: the autonomous individual's "choice" of
belief. "Churches" become "religious organizations" and pos37. Garvey, supra note 23, at 569-70.
38. Curran v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No. 1562-87, slip op. at 8-9 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1987).
39. Id. at 19.
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sess no intrinsic order other than that chosen by freely associating individuals. This presupposition is hardly "neutral" where
faith is presumed to include an essential ecclesial dimension.
This brings us back to Garvey's main query about religious
freedom: is it really about groups or individuals? I think it the
central question before us, and upon it no neutrality is
possible.

